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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Carlos A Cruz-Romero appeals from the judgment entered upon Cruz-
Romero's conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence. Cruz-
Romero contends that the district court erred in making an in limine evidentiary 
ruling that, absent expert testimony, Cruz-Romero could not present evidence 
that the test results showing he had a blood alcohol content of .097/.096 were 
unreliable. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On April 27, 2014, Sergeant Matthew West was dispatched to a report of a 
possible drunk driver who was observed "swerving all over the road" and "almost 
hit[ting] two vehicles." (R., p.15.) After Sergeant West located the reported 
vehicle, he followed it and observed it "make a wide turn and drive down the 
middle of the street." (R.,p.15.) Sergeant West initiated a traffic stop and, as he 
approached the car, he saw the female passenger try to switch seats with the 
driver who he later identified as Cruz-Romero. (R., p.15.) When Sergeant West 
got to the car, he "opened the driver's side door[,] told everybody to stop moving[, 
and] immediately smelled the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage .... " (R., 
p.15.) Sergeant West also saw open cans of beer inside the car. (R., p.15.) As 
Sergeant West talked to Cruz-Romero, he could "smell the odor of an alcoholic 
beverage" and Cruz-Romero admitted he had consumed six beers. (R., p.16.) 
Sergeant West arrested Cruz-Romero for driving under the influence after which 
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Cruz-Romero submitted to breath testing, which revealed his breath alcohol 
content ("BAG") was .097/.096. (R., pp.17-18, 21.) 
The state charged Cruz-Romero with felony driving under the influence, 
possession of an open container in a motor vehicle, driving without privileges, 
and resisting and obstructing. (R., pp.10-13, 51-55, 65-69.) Prior to trial, the 
state filed a motion in limine asking the court to prevent Cruz-Romero from 
presenting testimony that the lntoxilyzer 5000EN used to obtain his breath 
samples was "out of tolerance" at different times because there was no evidence 
that the machine was out of tolerance or otherwise not working properly at the 
time of Cruz-Romero's tests. (R., pp.144-146.) The court held an evidentiary 
hearing on the state's motion in limine after which it granted the state's request. 
(Tr., pp.5-36.) Cruz-Romero subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to the 
felony driving under the influence charge, reserving the right to appeal the court's 
in limine ruling, and the state dismissed the three misdemeanor charges. (Tr., 
p.38, L.14 - p.39, L.23; R., p.184.) The court imposed a unified 10-year 
sentence with three years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Cruz-
Romero on probation. (R., pp.167-174.) Cruz-Romero filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R., pp.187-189.) 
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ISSUES 
Cruz-Romero states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Did the district court err by granting the State's motion in 
limine to exclude evidence of the lntoxilyzer malfunctioning? 
2. Did the district court violate Mr. Cruz-Romero's constitutional 
right to present a complete defense by excluding evidence of the 
lntoxilyzer malfunctioning? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Cruz-Romero failed to show any error in the district court's in limine 
ruling that, absent expert testimony, Cruz-Romero could not challenge the 
lntoxilyzer's reliability? 
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ARGUMENT 
Cruz-Romero Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Its In Umine Ruling 
That, Absent Expert Testimony, Cruz-Romero Could Not Challenge The 
lntoxilyzer's Reliability 
A. Introduction 
Cruz-Romero asserts the district court abused its discretion in making its 
in limine ruling that, absent expert testimony, Cruz-Romero could not challenge 
the lntoxilyzer's reliability. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-16.) A review of the record 
and the applicable law shows Cruz-Romero's complaints about the district court's 
ruling fail and his constitutional challenge to the court's decision is unpreserved 
and otherwise fails on its merits. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citations omitted). 
Foundation is a preliminary question of admissibility to be decided by the trial 
court. I.RE. 104. 
C. Cruz-Romero Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's In 
Limine Ruling 
Under Idaho Code § 18-8004(4), evidence that a defendant had an 
alcohol concentration of .08 or above at the time of evidentiary testing is 
conclusive proof of the defendant's guilt. State v. Tomlinson, 159 Idaho 112, 
_, 357 P.3d 238, 246 (Ct. App. 2015). ''To show that a blood test revealed a 
BAC of [.08] or higher, the state may rely on LC. § 18-8004(4), which provides an 
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expedient method for admitting BAG test results into evidence when the analysis 
is conducted pursuant to [Idaho State Police] standards." State v. Uhlry, 121 
Idaho 1020, 1022, 829 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
Although the margin of error in testing equipment is irrelevant, a defendant may 
challenge the "accuracy and reliability of the specific machine used in his or her 
case or the test results obtained therefrom." Tomlinson, 159 Idaho at _, 357 
P.3d at 246-247. For example, a defendant "may challenge a breathalyzer 
insofar as it measured the defendant's breath alcohol concentration, including 
whether the breathalyzer accurately measured his breath alcohol concentration, 
whether the particular device was working properly at the time of the breath test, 
and whether the breath test was properly administered." ~at_ 357, P.3d at 
247 (citations omitted). This does not, however, mean the evidence does not 
have to satisfy other admissibility requirements, such as relevance and 
foundation. See I.RE. 401, 402, 702, 703. 
In this case, the state's in limine request sought to prevent Cruz-Romero 
from presenting evidence that the lntoxliyzer used to test his breath samples was 
"out of tolerance" at certain times before and after Cruz-Romero was tested 
unless Cruz-Romero could "come up with an expert" who could testify "that the 
machine was, in fact, not working on that day." (R., pp.144-146; Tr., p.27, L.7 -
p.28, L.13; see Exhibit A) In support of its motion, the state presented testimony 
from Deputy Roger Sedlmayr, a "breath test specialist for the State of Idaho." 
(Tr., p.6, Ls.6-21.) Deputy Sedlmayr testified that he is responsible for ensuring 
that the lntoxilyzer is "within a calibration which would mean that it's just 
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functioning properly." (Tr., p.6, L.24 L.2.) To do this, Deputy Sedlmayr 
runs "calibration checks and tests on [the lntoxilyzerJ to make sure that it's just 
operating within the normal parameters." (Tr., p.7, Ls.3-7.) He tests the 
lntoxilyzer using both a 0.2 solution, for excessive alcohol concentration, and a 
.08 solution, for "regular" alcohol concentration. (Tr., p.7, L.14 - p.8, L.4.) If the 
results of the tests "are within the proper parameters," the lntoxilyzer is 
"functioning properly." (Tr., p.8, Ls.9-11.) The Instrument Operations Log for the 
lntoxilyzer used to test Cruz-Romero showed that it was "out of tolerance" on 
April 5, 2014, May 15, 2014, and May 16, 2014, and "was not calibrating properly 
for the .2 solution" when it was tested on August 5, 2014. (Tr., p.18, L.14 - p.22, 
L.9; Exhibit A.) But, routine calibration checks performed on April 8, 2014, 19 
days before Cruz-Romero was tested, and on May 9, 2014, 12 days after Cruz-
Romero was tested, revealed the lntoxilyzer was properly calibrated, and the 
Instrument Log reflects no defects between those two dates, which would include 
April 27, 2014 - the date Cruz-Romero was tested. (Tr., p.8, Ls.19-25, p.25, 
L.15 - p.26, L.12; Exhibit A.) 
During argument on the state's motion, the district court noted the state 
disclosed Rachel Cutler, who works at the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab and 
who examined the lntoxilyzer at issue (Tr., p.10, Ls.3-10), and asked why Cruz-
Romero should not be able to cross-examine her if she testified at trial (Tr., p.33, 
L.19 - p.34, L.2). In response, the prosecutor advised the court that Ms. Cutler 
was only disclosed as a rebuttal expert as a "preliminary procedure" the state 
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"took in order to have somebody [available who] could testify that, in fact, on that 
the instrument was working properly." (Tr., p.34, Ls.3-9.) 
Cruz-Romero admitted he did not have an expert who could testify that the 
lntoxilyzer was not working properly on April 27, 2014, but complained the state 
was asking to "preclude[ him] from cross examining their [sic] expert as to their 
[sic] conclusions." (Tr., p.34, Ls.16-21.) Cruz-Romero argued: "If the expert's 
allowed to testify based on whatever information they have that this machine was 
working properly, the defense has a right to question what they [sic] base that 
decision on." (Tr., p.34, Ls.21-24.) The district court agreed that, if the state 
called Ms. Cutler, Cruz-Romero had the right to cross-examine her but asked 
how the evidence was relevant if the state did not call Ms. Cutler in its case-in-
chief. (Tr., p.34, L.25 - p.35, L.4.) Cruz-Romero responded by noting that 
Deputy Sedlmayr is also an expert who should be subject to cross-examination. 
(Tr., p.35, Ls.5-9.) The district court then ruled on the state's motion as follows: 
The Court is going to -- as far as the evidence of the 
malfunctioning of the lntox 5000, the evidence before the Court, at 
this time, demonstrates that between the certification of the 
machine on April 8th and the recertification on May 9th that it does 
appear, at least from the logs, that the machine was working 
properly at that time. There is no indication about a tolerance. 
Presumptively, the State's evidence will demonstrate the 
certification for the lntoxilizer [sic], the reliability of the test results. 
Absent expert testimony on the subject, the Court would find that 
any evidence of indications that the lntox 5000 was out of tolerance 
either before April 8th of 2014 or after May 9, 2014, is not of 
probative value. And certainly if the State does intend to call Ms. 
Cutler, then that certainly may change the analysis, but at this time, 
the Court does find that the test results before April 8th and after 
May 9th are not relevant and would not be admissible at trial. 
(Tr., p.35, L 10 - p.36, L.6.) 
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On appeal, Cruz-Romero contends the district court's ruling was 
erroneous for several reasons. First, Cruz-Romero complains that the district 
court "abused its discretion by making a factual finding that should have been left 
to the jury" regarding whether the "lntoxilyzer was working properly between April 
8 and May 9." (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) This "factual finding" was neither 
erroneous nor binding on a non-existent jury. The evidence presented at the 
hearing was that the lntoxilyzer was working correctly at the time of Cruz-
Romero's tests and, in fact, if it is "out of tolerance," the lntoxilyzer "won't allow 
the testing procedure to proceed." (Tr., p.22, Ls.12-15.) That the district court 
found as much at a pre-trial hearing would not have prevented a jury from finding 
that the lntoxilyzer malfunctioned had Cruz-Romero proceeded to trial and 
presented expert evidence to that effect. Cruz-Romero's complaint about the 
district court's "factual finding" does not show error in the district court's in limine 
ruling. 
Cruz-Romero next complains that "the court erred by finding that evidence 
of the lntoxilyzer malfunctioning was not relevant." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) This 
argument misstates the district court's ruling. What the court ruled was that 
"[a]bsent expert testimony on the subject" of the "reliability of the test results," 
"any evidence of indications that the lntox 5000 was out of tolerance either 
before April 8th of 2014 or after May 9, 2014, is not of probative value." (Tr., 
p.35, Ls.19-25.) 
Next, Cruz-Romero argues that the district court "abused its discretion by 
holding that [he] may have been able to introduce that evidence to cross-
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examine Ms. Cutler, but not Deputy Sedlmayr." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) 
According to Cruz-Romero, the "court did not provide its reasoning for 
differentiating between the two witnesses." (Appeilant's Brief, p.13.) Cruz-
Romero again misstates the record. The district court never held that Cruz-
Romero could cross-examine Ms. Cutler, but not Mr. Sedlmayr. As noted, the 
district court commented on the state listing Ms. Cutler as a witness and asked 
the prosecutor why Cruz-Romero could not cross-examine her on her opinions. 
(Tr., p.33, L.19 - p.34, L.2.) The prosecutor explained she only listed Ms. Cutler 
as a rebuttal expert, and the court expressly stated that Cruz-Romero would be 
able to cross-examine Ms. Cutler if she was called as a witness. (Tr., p.34, Ls.3-
9, p.34, L.25 - p.35, L.4.) When asked how the challenged evidence was 
relevant if the state did not call Ms. Cutler, Cruz-Romero's only response was 
that Deputy Sedlmayr is also an expert who should be subject to cross-
examination. (Tr., p.35, Ls.5-9.) Although the court only specifically referenced 
Ms. Cutler, it never disagreed with the proposition that if Deputy Sedlmayr was 
called as a witness, Cruz-Romero could cross-examine him on his opinions. 
(See Tr., pp.35-36.) The record, however, reveals that, like Ms. Cutler, Deputy 
Sedlmayr was not one of the state's original trial witnesses (R., p.105), but he 
and Ms. Cutler were only added to the witness list after Cruz-Romero filed his 
exhibit list, which included only the first four pages of the Instrument Operations 
Log (R., pp.90-95), and just prior to the hearing on the state's motion in limine. 
Indeed, given the state's ability to present Cruz-Romero's breath test results 
through Sergeant Matthew West, who actually conducted the test (R., pp.14-17), 
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and who was on the state's original witness list (R., p.105), there would be no 
reason to call Deputy Sedlmayr as a witness. it is apparent that the state 
did not intend to call Deputy Sedlmayr in its case-in-chief either, and the district 
court's ruling regarding the ability to cross-examine an expert would apply 
equally to Deputy Sedlmayr if the state called him as a witness. The district 
court's in limine ruling cannot reasonably be read any other way. Moreover, 
because Cruz-Romero pied guilty, he cannot show that he was prevented from 
cross-examining any expert the state may have called as a witness at trial as the 
district court indicated he would be allowed to do. State v. Haynes, 159 Idaho 
36, _, 355 P.3d 1266, 1272 (2015) (finding that because defendant pied guilty 
before the trial court "made any ruling regarding the admissibility of the [breath] 
test, she did not preserve the issue for appeal"). Cruz-Romero's contention that 
the court abused its discretion by "holding" that he could cross-examine Ms. 
Culter, but not Deputy Sedlmayr is without merit. 
To the extent Cruz-Romero is arguing that he should have been able to 
present expert testimony in his own case-in-chief regarding the "out of tolerance" 
test results, and was prevented from doing so, he did not make that argument to 
the district court. Any such argument is, therefore, not preserved and this Court 
should not consider it. State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 886, 303 P.3d 241, 245 
(Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted) ("Generally, issues not raised below may not be 
considered for the first time on appeal."); see State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 
878, 885, 119 P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted) ("Under Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1 ), a party opposing proffered evidence must make a 
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objection stating specific ground of objection unless the specific 
is apparent from the context. An objection on one ground 
preserve a separate and different basis for excluding the evidence."). 
Even if considered, Cruz-Romero made no showing that his breath test 
results were unreliable or that the lntoxilyzer was not functioning properly at the 
time Sergeant West administered the breath tests. As explained in Tomlinson, 
159 Idaho at_, 357 P.3d at 247, "a defendant may impeach the accuracy of 
his specific breath test result with evidence that his or her blood alcohol content 
at the time of the breath test was different than the breath alcohol content 
provided by the breathalyzer." (Emphasis original.) A defendant may also 
challenge the "reliability and performance of any given machine." State v. Ward, 
135 Idaho 400,404, 17 P.3d 901, 905 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting State v. Hartwig, 
112 Idaho 370, 375, 732 P.2d 339, 344 (Ct. App. 1987)). "If there is evidence 
that any particular machine has malfunctioned or was designed or operated so 
as to produce unreliable results, such evidence would be relevant both to the 
admissibility and the weight of the test results." kl Cruz-Romero did not identify 
any evidence that he could present to demonstrate that his specific test results 
were unreliable or that the lntoxilyzer malfunctioned at the time of testing. The 
only evidence presented at the hearing was that the lntoxilyzer was working 
properly and that it would not "allow the testing procedure to proceed" if it was 
"out of tolerance" (Tr., p.22, Ls.10-17), and Cruz-Romero admitted at the hearing 
that he did not have an expert who could testify otherwise (Tr., p.34, Ls.16-19). 
Absent foundational evidence demonstrating that the "out of tolerance" tests 
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before April 8 and after May 9 showed the lntoxilyzer was not working properly 
on April 27, the "out of tolerance" tests on different dates was not relevant or 
probative. Comoare State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 135, 867 P.2d 1006, 
1009 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding no error in exclusion of evidence of outward signs 
of actual intoxication, or lack thereof, because evidence is not relevant when 
there is no foundation establishing link between "reasonably expected symptoms 
of intoxication of someone with the defendant's physical characteristics and a 
breath alcohol content as shown by the lntoximeter"). The district could not err in 
excluding evidence Cruz-Romero did not have. 
Finally, Cruz-Romero contends that the district court's in limine ruling 
violated his "constitutional right to present a complete defense." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.15.) Cruz-Romero did not preserve this issue for appeal. Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 103(a)(1) provides that an objection must state "the specific ground of 
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context." An objection 
on one ground will not preserve a separate and different basis for objecting. 
State v. Rocha, 157 Idaho 246, 251, 335 P.3d 586, 591 (Ct. App. 2014) (citations 
omitted). "The requirement of a specific objection is to alert the trial court and the 
other party to the grounds of the objection so that it may be addressed or cured." 
~ Cruz-Romero never objected to the state's motion on constitutional grounds. 
(See generally Tr., pp.28-31, 34-35.) While unpreserved issues may be 
considered for the first time on appeal under the fundamental error doctrine, 
Cruz-Romero has not attempted to argue fundamental error, much less 
established such. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) Indeed, Cruz-
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Romero appears to be proceeding on the assumption that he preserved a 
constitutional claim by arguing at the in limine hearing that he had the "right to 
question" any expert called by the state as to the basis of his or her conclusions. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.16 (quoting Tr., p.34, L.18 - p.35, L.9).) This argument falls 
far short of alerting the trial court to any perceived constitutional infirmity in its 
ruling. Because Cruz-Romero failed to preserve any constitutional challenge, 
this Court should decline to consider this argument on appeal. 
Even if this Court considers Cruz-Romero's claim that his constitutional 
right to present a defense was violated as a result of the court's in /imine ruling, 
the claim fails. There is no constitutional right to present evidence that is 
irrelevant. State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 956-957, 231 P.3d 1047, 1053-1054 
(Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted). Nor is there a constitutional right to present 
evidence without proper foundation. See kl Nothing in the record supports 
Cruz-Romero's claim that he was denied his constitutional right to present a 
defense at trial as a result of the court's in limine ruling that, absent expert 
testimony, Cruz-Romero could not present evidence at trial that the lntoxilyzer 
was malfunctioning at times other than when he was tested. Cruz-Romero's 
unpreserved constitutional claim fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's 
judgment of conviction. 
DATED this 23rd day of December 2015. 
JEps,cA M. LORELLO 
Dep_uty Attorney General 
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14 
